

MID-AMERICA

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Colorado Volunteers Save New Mexico for the Union

At the outbreak of the War for Southern independence, the Territory of New Mexico, consisting of the present-day states of Arizona and New Mexico, was a vast expanse of land which lay between California and Texas. Since New Mexico was still largely a frontier area, the War Department had garrisoned troops at various posts within the Territory to protect the citizens from hostile Indians. Barren and forbidding in appearance, this country was barely able to produce enough to support its people. Of a population of 86,793, nearly 85,000 were Mexicans who, only thirteen years before, had become American citizens by terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Long isolated from the rest of the world, the Mexicans in general exhibited little interest in outside affairs. Aside from army personnel, several thousand Americans also resided in the Territory. Most of these were government officials, professional men, merchants, traders, ranchers, or miners. Though some mineral exploitation had begun, New Mexico offered little in the way of wealth. When war came, however, its geographical position caused it to be of considerable importance. If the Confederacy could control New Mexico it might be able to send a force westward to capture the state of California with its seaports and gold fields.

During the first week of July, 1861, Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Baylor, with a force of 375 men, occupied Fort Bliss, Texas, for the Confederacy. Forty miles to the north lay the federal garrison at Fort Fillmore. Rather than await a possible attack from that quarter, Baylor launched a "lightning" campaign which resulted in the capture of the entire force at Fort Fillmore, bringing all of



southern New Mexico under his domination. In accord with the majority opinion of the white inhabitants, Baylor created the Territory of Arizona from southern New Mexico and proclaimed himself military governor.

But Baylor's force was small and if the Federal forces in northern New Mexico rallied, the Confederates could be easily driven from the Territory. President Jefferson Davis was quick to take stock of the situation. In July, 1861, Henry Hopkins Sibley, an officer who had just resigned his commission while stationed in New Mexico, was commissioned a brigadier-general. He was ordered to raise a brigade in Texas and proceed west to drive the remaining Federals from New Mexico. Though ill-equipped and ill-supplied, the "Sibley Brigade" began its campaign. At the battle of Valverde on February 21, 1862, the Confederates defeated the Union troops under the command of the departmental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward R. S. Canby. The Federals retreated to Fort Craig after the battle. Since that fort was too strong to be taken by siege, the Confederates decided to leave it behind and continue their march up the Rio Grande Valley. Fort Union in northern New Mexico was the most important post in the Territory, for it held valuable military supplies and was the key to communication with the East. If Fort Union fell, Fort Craig would have to yield, and all of New Mexico would be in Confederate hands.

After the disaster of Valverde, Colonel Gabriel R. Paul, the commander of Fort Union, assumed "command of all troops, posts, and depots" in the Department of New Mexico which were not immediately under the command of Colonel Canby.¹ Other than Canby, Paul was the next ranking officer. This action did not imply that Paul was superseding or even equating himself with Canby in authority. Since the commander of the department was cut off from regular communication, Paul was merely assuming authority in the northern district as Canby's subordinate.

As the Confederates continued their northward advance, Paul reported that the "state of affairs in the Department of New Mexico . . . [had] been daily growing from bad to worse." The bulk of the militia and considerable numbers of the volunteers had "deserted and taken to the mountains. A general system of robbery and plunder . . . [seemed] to be the order of the day." Although he was probably exaggerating, Paul maintained that there was "general panic in the country, and people . . . [were] flying from their homes."²

¹ Paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862, *War of the Rebellion . . . the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, Volume IX, 645-646, hereafter cited as *O. R. A.* Unless otherwise noted, all citations are to Series I.

² *Ibid.*

The native New Mexican troops had proven sorely disappointing. Major James L. Donaldson, who was exasperated by their conduct, maintained that no reliance could be placed on either the militia or volunteers; and he advised that they be formally disbanded. According to the major, "they . . . [had] a traditionary fear of the Texans, and . . . [would] not face them in the field."³ Canby's assistant adjutant, Captain Gurden Chapin, after observing that the militia had run away and that the volunteers were deserting in large numbers, expressed much the same attitude. To him the native troops were "worse than worthless; they . . . [were] really aids to the enemy, who . . . [caught] them, . . . [took] their arms, and . . . [told] them to go home."⁴ From Fort Craig, Canby warned his subordinates, "Do not trust the Mexican troops."⁵ Even Governor Connelly, who had written glowing letters about the merits and spirit of the new Mexican troops before the battle of Valverde, had changed his mind. Dejectedly he reported that "the militia . . . [had] all dispersed, and . . . [had] gone to preparing their lands for the coming harvest." Connelly admitted that this was "by far the best use that could be made of them."⁶ The actions and attitude of the native New Mexican population made it quite clear that if the Union was successfully to hold the Territory, it would have to do it with white troops.

Before the battle of Valverde, Colonel Canby had sent urgent appeals to the Governor of Colorado for reinforcements. Though only one company of Colorado volunteers had arrived in time to take part in the encounter, Canby's pleas had some effect. On February 10, 1862, Major-General David Hunter, commanding the Department of Kansas to which Colorado was attached, instructed Acting Governor Lewis Weld to "send all available forces" at his disposal to reinforce Canby and to keep open his communication through Fort Wise. Weld was urged to "act promptly and with all the discretion of . . . [his] latest information as to what . . . [might] be necessary and where the troops of Colorado . . . [could] do most service."⁷

Governor William Gilpin, who earlier had taken measures to raise sufficient volunteer forces in Colorado, had failed to obtain

³ Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 636.

⁴ Chapin to Halleck, February 28, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 634.

⁵ Canby to Donaldson, March 7, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 647.

⁶ Connelly to Seward, March 11, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 645.

⁷ Hunter to Acting Governor of Colorado, February 10, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 630.

Federal appropriations for the defense of the Territory. As a result he had resorted to the unauthorized issuance of drafts on the United States Treasury. The drafts were used to buy ammunition and supplies for the equipping of the volunteer companies which were being organized.⁸ If any citizen refused to accept these "Gilpin drafts," he was informed, "Now this is only a question of whether you will take them as an evidence of indebtedness or whether we take the property without any evidence of it."⁹ Drafts to the amount of \$375,000 were issued,¹⁰ and when they were at first not recognized by the Federal government, financial distress ensued and a strong faction in the Territory demanded the governor's removal.¹¹ Gilpin was recalled to Washington to explain his conduct; and while he was away, the territorial secretary, Lewis Weld, assumed the duties of the governorship.¹²

Acting Governor Weld attempted to notify the commander of the Department of New Mexico that he had ordered seven companies of the First Regiment Colorado Volunteers to march to Santa Fe.¹³ Since Canby was still at Fort Craig and cut off from regular communication, Major Donaldson, commanding in Santa Fe, received the notice of the coming of reinforcements. Quickly he dispatched a "trusty" messenger to Canby, urging him to delay the enemy as much as possible and communicating the fact of a Colorado regiment being on the road to his relief.¹⁴

Three companies of the First Colorado were stationed at Fort Wise, Colorado, and "feeling that it was possible that . . . [Canby] might desire these troops" also, Weld notified Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan to consider himself under Canby's orders.¹⁵ Upon

⁸ Percy S. Fritz, *Colorado, The Centennial State*, New York, 1941, 202.

⁹ John M. Chivington, *The First Colorado Regiment*, manuscript in the Bancroft Library, University of California. Written in 1884 this reminiscence is a valuable primary source. However, since twenty-two years elapsed between the events and the writing of the work, there is danger that Chivington's memory may have been faulty in part. It is interesting to compare this work with his official reports which were written immediately after his participation in the several battles in the ensuing New Mexican campaign.

¹⁰ Fritz, *Colorado*, 202.

¹¹ Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming*, San Francisco, 1890, 426-427. Bancroft deals at length with the New Mexican campaign and the role of the Colorado Volunteers in his *History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888*, San Francisco, 1889. A brief summary of the campaign can be found in his *History of the North Mexican States and Texas*, II, San Francisco, 1889.

¹² William C. Whitford, *Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War*, Denver, 1906, 53, 75.

¹³ Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 631.

¹⁴ Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 636.

¹⁵ Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 631-32.

receipt of this communication, Tappan informed Donaldson of Hunter's and Weld's orders.¹⁶ Fort Wise was an important post in holding open the line of communication with the East, and Governor Weld suggested that "in the present state of things at the post it might be easily held by a detachment of Mexican troops," thus freeing Tappan's men for field duty.¹⁷ Acting for Canby, Donaldson lost no time in instructing Tappan to join the other companies of his regiment which were coming to New Mexico by way of Fort Garland.¹⁸

After ordering all the available troops in his Territory to the aid of Colonel Canby, Weld expressed the hope that the Colorado Volunteers would prove to be efficient and would ably support the Union cause in New Mexico. The governor "trust[ed] that their enthusiasm and patriotic bravery . . . [would] make amends, and more than that, for their lack of service in the past."¹⁹

Although the Colorado troops were known to be on their way, several of Canby's subordinates believed that more reinforcements would be necessary. Captain Gurden Chapin sent a dispatch to Major-General H. W. Halleck, commanding the Department of the Missouri. The captain explained that he would have sent his communication to General Hunter, a nearer military commander, but he feared that Hunter would "be absent on the field" when his letter arrived. Chapin asserted that New Mexico was in a "critical" condition, and though aware that a force of Colorado Volunteers was on the way, he feared that the regiment might not arrive in time to save the Federal forces in New Mexico from immediate danger. To Chapin, the conquest of New Mexico by the Texans was a "great political feature of the rebellion. It . . . [would] gain the rebels a name and a prestige over Europe, and operate against the Union cause. It therefore should not only be checked, but it should at any future period during the spring or summer be rendered impossible." The captain believed that the Texans would not rest with the forces that they already had with them, but would attempt to get large additions to their command in New Mexico, "in order to extend their conquest toward Old Mexico and in the direction of Southern California." Chapin begged "in the name of Colonel Canby who . . . [was] fighting two to one, and laying valuable

¹⁶ Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 636.

¹⁷ Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 632.

¹⁸ Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 636.

¹⁹ Weld to Canby, February 14, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 632.

lives upon this issue, to send at once—lose not a day—at least two regiments infantry and a battery of rifled cannon to Fort Union. These troops . . . [could] not serve the Government better than by saving this Territory.”²⁰

Before abandoning Sante Fe, Major James L. Donaldson had also sent out urgent pleas for more reinforcements. The major notified General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of the Army, that he considered Canby's situation as critical and “would most earnestly advise that no time be lost in sending re-enforcements” to New Mexico.²¹ Donaldson also wrote to General Halleck and informed him that although a regiment of Colorado Volunteers was on the march to New Mexico, the snow was deep on the Taos Mountains; and he feared that the regiment might not get through in time. Donaldson “urgently recommended” that four regiments of infantry, some cavalry, and a battery of rifled cannon be sent at once to Fort Union.²²

Colonel Paul at Fort Union was also impressed with the gravity of the situation and he urged a “re-enforcement of 4,000 men, two batteries of rifled cannon, and six siege pieces.” To insure an adequate consideration of New Mexico's plight, Paul ordered Major Donaldson to go to Washington, D. C., “to represent the interest and wants of the department” and to “enter more fully into details.”²³

As the Confederates continued their northward advance, Colonel Paul began concentrating the Union troops in the northern district at Fort Union. At that post he began organizing and equipping a column with the intention of marching southward to form a junction with Canby's forces. Once the Union armies in the Territory were united, Paul believed the Federals would be able to drive the Texans out.²⁴ On March 9, Paul sent a dispatch to Canby in which he unfolded his plan to unite Canby's troops with those of his own. According to this arrangement, Paul would move southward from Fort Union on March 24. By taking a back road, avoiding the Rio Grande Valley and the Texans, Paul and his column of 1,200 white troops and four guns, expected to arrive two days later at the village of Anton Chico. Here he would await the arrival of Canby's men, which, if they left on March 20, could arrive five days later. Should the Confederates threaten either his position or that of Canby before

²⁰ Chapin to Halleck, February 28, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 634-35.

²¹ Donaldson to Thomas, March 1, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 636.

²² Donaldson to Halleck, March 1, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 637.

²³ Paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 646.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

the junction was made, Paul planned to continue his southward march until he met Canby's column. Paul suggested that in order to confuse the Texans as to his true intent, Canby should send his mounted men with two guns to a point about thirty or forty miles up the river from La Joya. This feint would make it appear that the Federals planned to attack the Confederates in the rear. While the Texans were being deceived, Canby's main column could proceed safely to Socorro and across to Abo Pass and Punta del Agua. With a mountain range between him and the Rio Grande Valley, Canby could safely proceed to Anton Chico.²⁵ In a dispatch dated March 14, Canby approved of Paul's plan and the commander of Fort Union hastened to complete the organization of his column.²⁶

* * *

During the latter part of August, 1861, the First Regiment Colorado Volunteers was organized. The nucleus was the two volunteer companies which had already been raised. John P. Slough, the captain of Company A, was appointed colonel. Samuel F. Tappan, captain of Company B, became lieutenant-colonel, and John M. Chivington was commissioned a major.²⁷ After the organization of the regiment, the women of Denver City presented the unit with a "handsome silk flag."²⁸ On the Platte River, two miles from the center of Denver City, barracks were erected and the encampment was named Camp Weld, in honor of the territorial secretary.²⁹

The regiment may have been composed of good material in the main; but it nonetheless contained a considerable number of undisciplined and restless men. Most of the volunteers had enlisted with the idea of serving actively in the eastern campaigns and were thus disappointed with the inactivity of Camp Weld. As a result of this idleness, the men became dissatisfied and reckless. There were as many as two or three companies at a time who were stripped of their arms and placed under arrest with their officers for mutiny.³⁰

²⁵ Paul to Canby, March 9, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 653.

²⁶ Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 652.

²⁷ Ovando J. Hollister, *A History of the First Colorado Regiment of Volunteers*, Denver, 1863, reprinted as *Boldly They Rode*, Lakewood, 1949, 5. Hereafter cited as Hollister, *A History of the First*. This is an interesting primary account written more or less in diary form by a member of the First Regiment. Bancroft, in writing his several accounts of the Colorado Volunteers in the New Mexican campaign, relied heavily upon Hollister's work.

²⁸ *Rocky Mountain News*, August 21, 1861.

²⁹ Hollister, *A History of the First*, 6.

³⁰ Chivington, *The First Colorado Regiment*.

Discipline was difficult to maintain and the citizens of Denver City had to have an extra police force to protect their property from the nocturnal forays of the drunken and rowdy soldiers.³¹ The men were publicly accused of being "chicken thieves, jayhawkers, turbulent and seditious, a disgrace to themselves and the country."³² Three companies of the regiment were sent to help garrison Fort Wise; but the men were no better pleased there than they had been at Camp Weld. Fort Wise was commanded by Lieutenant Warner, a regular army officer, "who regarded the manners of the volunteers with great disfavor, a view which was entirely reciprocated."³³

Early in January an express arrived from New Mexico bringing the news of the Confederate advance and a call for assistance.³⁴ Since Colorado was within the jurisdiction of the Department of Kansas, permission from the commander of that department had to be received before the troops could be sent to New Mexico's aid. Gilpin had already departed for Washington, and Acting Governor Weld applied to General Hunter for authority to send the regiment to New Mexico.³⁵ Major Chivington also wrote to Hunter and asked for marching orders. He maintained that unless the men were put into the field, they would desert in the spring.³⁶ Finally the "long desired word to march was given," but the month's delay in receiving the order from Fort Leavenworth caused considerable discontent among the troops, as most of them were anxious to see action.³⁷ No doubt the citizens of Denver City were also quite relieved when the order arrived, sending the First Regiment on its way.

The day after the battle of Valverde (February 22, 1862), Colonel Slough, in command of the seven companies of the regiment, left Camp Weld.³⁸ Nine days later the other three companies, under Tappan, set out from Fort Wise. On March 4, while Tappan's men were encamped at Bent's Fort, Captain A. F. Garrison, Chief of Subsistence at Fort Union, arrived by special coach. Unaware that the regiment had already begun its march, Garrison had been ordered to Fort Wise to urge the Volunteers' "immediate advance." In order to move ahead as rapidly as possible, Tappan ordered his men

³¹ Bancroft, *Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming*, 421.

³² Hollister, *A History of the First*, 7.

³³ Bancroft, *Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming*, 421.

³⁴ Hollister, *A History of the First*, 36.

³⁵ Whitford, *Colorado Volunteers*, 75.

³⁶ Chivington, *The First Colorado Regiment*.

³⁷ Hollister, *A History of the First*, 36.

³⁸ Whitford, *Colorado Volunteers*, 75.

to carry only a change of shirts and a pair of blankets. No longer incumbered by their baggage wagons, the three companies were able to march rapidly forward. On March 5, Tappan left the Arkansas River and headed toward the Purgatoire, some seventy-five miles away. While en route, Lieutenant B. N. Sanford of Company H arrived from Slough's command to inform Tappan that the seven companies had crossed the Arkansas River at Pueblo the morning before, and that the two detachments of the regiment would unite at the crossing of the Purgatoire River.³⁹

On March 7, the three companies arrived at the headwaters of the Purgatoire, at the base of the Raton Mountains, half an hour after Slough and the bulk of the regiment had arrived.⁴⁰ The rendezvous was at Gray's ranch, near the present-day city of Trinidad.⁴¹ That evening the camp of the reunited regiment had the "bustle and hum of a small town." The assembled regiment "'fell in' and gave the Colonel three cheers and a tiger. He raised his cap, but did not speak." Colonel Slough apparently did not properly understand human nature. Although he had a noble appearance, the men seemed to lack confidence in him. "His aristocratic style savor[ed] more of eastern society than of the free-and-easy border to which he should have become acclimated." He had been the regiment's colonel for six months and during that period he had never spoken to his troops. He failed to understand that "on the eve of an important expedition, after a long absence," a few words from him were indispensable to a good understanding.⁴²

On March 9, an ambulance carrying several officers from Fort Union met the Coloradoans on the southern slope of the Raton Mountains.⁴³ They informed Slough that they had abandoned Santa Fe and urged him to march ahead as fast as possible. Colonel Paul had reportedly mined Fort Union and was preparing to abandon the place if the Texans appeared.⁴⁴ Upon receipt of this news, the regiment "added wings" to its speed. By three o'clock the volunteers had reached the Red River where they halted and ate both dinner and supper at once.⁴⁵ Major Chivington lined up his men and asked, "All who will make a forced march for the night to save

³⁹ Hollister, *A History of the First*, 45-46

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁴¹ Whitford, *Colorado Volunteers*, 77.

⁴² Hollister, *A History of the First*, 47.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁴⁴ Chivington, *The First Colorado Regiment*.

⁴⁵ Hollister, *A History of the First*, 48.

Fort Union, step two paces to the front." Every man stepped out.⁴⁶ After leaving behind everything except their weapons and a pair of blankets, the men started out with all "possible and impossible speed" for Fort Union, some eighty miles distant. The baggage was left in charge of a corporal's guard and would be brought on later.⁴⁷

With the wagons emptied of most of their loads, many men climbed aboard to ride. Some three or four hundred were still left to walk, however, and "away into the wee hours of morning did . . . [they] tramp, tramp, tramp, the gay song, the gibe, the story, the boisterous cheer, all died a natural death. Nothing broke the stillness of the night but the steady tramp of the men and the rattle of the wagons." The overworking of the draught animals proved to be unwise and many began to "drop and die" in their harnesses. Had the regiment not attempted to drive the animals so hard, they could "doubtless have made Union without a halt." The next day the Coloradoans—soon to be called "Pike's Peakers" by the Texans—arrived at Maxwell's ranch on the Cimarron River, thirty miles from Fort Union. The owner was kindly disposed toward the Union soldiers and several companies were given quarters to sleep in that night. He also supplied the troops with 160 pounds of sugar and 100 pounds of coffee. The effects of the heavy driving had played heavily upon the stock and the fifteen or twenty animals were sick and many died, forcing the regiment to travel more slowly as the only alternative of losing them all.⁴⁸ The First Coloradoans had traveled sixty-seven miles continuously since the morning before, and a total of ninety-two miles in the previous thirty-six hours.⁴⁹

As the regiment approached Fort Union, the terrain became "uniformly descending." The valley in which the fort lay was about "four miles wide, smooth and pretty, bounded on the east and west by timbered ridges of no great elevation." Through the valley ran a little stagnant, alkali stream, and "within a mile of the west side of the vale, on a gentle swell, . . . [was] the fortification. A simple field-work of moderate size, with bastioned corners surrounded by dirt parapet and ditch, with a slight abattis at exposed points." Although the armament was poor, consisting mainly of howitzers, the supply of ammunition was considered adequate for

⁴⁶ Chivington, *The First Colorado Regiment*.

⁴⁷ Hollister, *A History of the First*, 48.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 48-50.

⁴⁹ Whitford, *Colorado Volunteers*, 78.

any emergency. Forming part of the works were bomb-proof quarters capable of housing five hundred men and all the fort's supplies. Under a two hundred foot "precipitous and rocky" ridge which bounded the valley on the west, lay the old post. It was "built of adobes, logs, slabs and lumber without any apparent order of system, and contain[ed] the usual accommodations for barracks."⁵⁰

The First Regiment arrived outside Fort Union on March 11. About dusk, the men had finished unloading their wagons and had formed in a column and marched into the post "with drums beating and colors flying." The volunteers halted in front of commanding officer Gabriel R. Paul's quarters, where "in rather unintelligible words," both he and Governor Connelly welcomed them. "They commended the zeal with which . . . [the Colorado Volunteers] had accomplished the march from Denver, but said nothing of the battle of Val Verde or of the whereabouts of the enemy at present; subjects that might naturally be supposed to slightly interest" the newly-arrived troops. Apparently the men were unimpressed with the welcoming oratory and one trooper remarked that he "thought they might as well have permitted the boys, hungry and tired, to go to their camp near the fortification as to have perpetrated this farce." The regulars at the post, numbering about four hundred, were also glad to see the Coloradoans "for they had been whipped in the fight below, and it was an undisguised fact that the Texans were having it their own way in the Territory." Within a few days the quartermaster department began issuing the Volunteers arms and clothing in preparation for the coming trial with the Texans.⁵¹

As in any army camp rumors "flew thick and fast" and when a dispatch arrived from Colonel Canby on March 14, speculation arose among the men as to the contents. "Madame Rumor . . . kindly furnished the news as follows: Canby . . . [had] captured a large train coming from below, with an escort of one hundred and fifty men. Gen. Sibley . . . [was] at Santa Fe, and recruits . . . [were] rapidly swelling his ranks. His number . . . [was] variously estimated at from twenty-five to thirty-five hundred." Rumored reports were also "rife every day of the near approach of any desired or undesired number of Kansas troops, but, like the Advents' Messiah, the date of their arrival . . . [was] postponed from time to time to suit the prophet."⁵²

⁵⁰ Hollister, *A History of the First*, 51-52.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 52, 54.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 54.

Soon after the arrival of the Colorado troops, an incident occurred in the Volunteers' infantry camp which was "but the natural consequence of the lawless tone of public sentiment in the regiment." Sergeant Philbrook of Company K had overindulged in spirits and when Lieutenant Gray of Company B attempted to arrest him for being drunk and disorderly, the sergeant fired five shots at him. One ball struck the officer on the bridge of the nose and glanced down and lodged in the lower part of his face. Though he must have suffered intense pain, Gray was not seriously injured. Officers who were standing nearby emptied their revolvers at Philbrook, but he managed to elude their aim. Later that night he was captured and confined to the guard house. This event caused great excitement among the men and Company B demanded "instant justice by lynch process." Company K attempted to tone down the incident by circulating several versions of the affair which were favorable to their sergeant. Only the quick and firm action of the officer of the day, Captain Sanborn, saved the prisoner from "Judge Lynch." He was safely locked up while the "excited passions of all parties" was allowed time to cool. During the month of April, Philbrook was tried by general court-martial and executed by a firing squad.⁵³

Other events indicated that at least certain members of the First Regiment left much to be desired. When Captain Pollock left for Denver City with the wagons which had transported the regiment to Fort Union, public property was discovered missing from the post. Suspicious that Pollock and his men had helped themselves, the commander hastily dispatched a detail of twenty men under Sergeant Wilson at sundown to overtake the train and bring back the stolen goods. On the night of March 21, a group of the Volunteers broke into the sutler's cellar and "gobbled a lot of whiskey, wine, canned fruit, oysters, etc."⁵⁴ Apparently the men of the regiment were behaving no better at Fort Union than they had in Denver City.

When Colonel Slough arrived at Fort Union, post commander Paul "had the mortification to discover" that the Coloradoan's commission was senior to his. By virtue of this seniority, Slough assumed command of the Union forces in the northern district and planned to carry out the junction with Canby according to Paul's original plan. Woefully, Paul wrote the Adjutant-General that he had been deprived of a command which he had taken "so much pains to organize and with which...[he had] expected to reap

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 53-54, 86.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 54-55.

laurels." Paul pointed out the injustice of an inexperienced officer of only six months' service taking precedence over him who had "many years' service, and who . . . [had] frequently been tried in battle." In order to prevent any such future occurrence, Paul "modestly" asked the War Department to bestow upon him the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers.⁵⁵

While Slough was completing the details for the coming march southward, a dispatch, dated March 16, arrived from Colonel Canby on March 21.⁵⁶ Canby had changed his mind about the date of the proposed junction. Apparently he believed that Fort Union was too valuable a post to be abandoned at this time, for he made it clear that all other points in the department were of no importance compared to Fort Union. Not only was it essential to maintain that post, but the line of communication with the East had to be kept open at all costs. If it became evident that Fort Garland could not be held, Canby, who did not know that Slough had assumed command, ordered Paul to abandon and destroy it and concentrate all the troops in the northern part of the department at Fort Union. Here he was to remain until reinforcements from Kansas, Colorado, or California arrived.⁵⁷

While awaiting the anticipated reinforcements, Canby suggested that Paul harass the Texans with partisan operations. This would involve relatively small units which would obstruct the Confederates' movements and remove or destroy any supplies that might possibly fall into the Texans' hands. Should sufficient reinforcements arrive, giving Paul a large enough force to operate directly against the enemy, Canby ordered Paul to notify him immediately of his plans so that he could cooperate from Fort Craig.⁵⁸ Later when Canby learned that Slough had assumed command, he sent essentially the same instructions to that officer.⁵⁹

Canby intended to retain Fort Craig as long as possible, for it was ideally situated to cut off any supplies coming to Sibley from the Mesilla Valley. It also might serve as a strategic point to cut off any contemplated Confederate retreat down the river. There was no need to send any immediate help to Fort Craig as it was stocked with enough food and supplies to last until April 10. Should Canby consider it necessary to abandon the fort, however, it would

⁵⁵ Paul to Adjutant-General, March 11, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 646.

⁵⁶ Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 652.

⁵⁷ Canby to Paul, March 16, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 653.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 653.

⁵⁹ Canby to Slough, March 18, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 649.

mean that his forces would have to unite with Paul's troops as soon as possible. All supplies which could not be carried would be destroyed and the sick and wounded would be left at Limitar. Thus relieved of these incumbrances, Canby's column could move rapidly northward to junction with the forces from Fort Union. When the decision to abandon the post had been made, Canby planned to send several messengers, by different routes, who would verbally inform Paul of the route and point of union. But until such information was received, Paul was instructed not to move from Fort Union for the purpose of forming a junction.⁶⁰

Differences of opinion soon developed between Slough and Paul over the interpretation of Canby's instructions. The matter was undoubtedly intensified by Paul's jealousy and Slough's apparent lack of tact. Garrison duty at Fort Union certainly was not improving the restless and undisciplined nature of Slough's men. His awareness of this fact, as well as his desire to "reap laurels," too, were probably the main reasons which motivated him to interpret loosely Canby's instructions. The "Pike's Peakers" had come to New Mexico to fight and Slough made it known that he planned to move against the enemy.⁶¹

Paul vigorously opposed Slough's decision to move in force from Fort Union. The colonel addressed a letter to Slough and informed him that he had originally turned over his command to him for the purpose of carrying out the plans approved by Canby "for the relief of and junction with his forces, to the end that when united the entire force should be used to drive the enemy from the Territory." But now Canby's dispatch of March 16 ordered that the movement from the post be delayed until further instructions. Paul believed that Slough's decision to move toward the enemy was contrary to Canby's orders; but if that officer was determined to move toward the enemy, Paul requested that he do so with his own regiment, two sections of artillery, and the regular cavalry which had already been sent out ahead as scouts. The remaining units of artillery and Captain W. H. Lewis' command of infantry were in Paul's opinion the smallest forces which could garrison the post securely. Yet even this would not be sufficient should Slough meet with disaster or advance so far as to be unable to return rapidly to the fort's relief if it was attacked.⁶²

⁶⁰ Canby to Paul, March 16, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 653.

⁶¹ Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 652.

⁶² Paul to Slough, March 22, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 654.

In reply to Paul's protests, Slough insisted that Canby's instructions were not only "to protect Fort Union, but also to harass the enemy." Slough reasoned that by moving his command to the vicinity of Bernal Springs, forty-five miles from Fort Union, both ends could be accomplished. At that point the Federals would be between the enemy and Fort Union, and thus the post would be as much protected as if the troops had remained there. At Bernal Springs the Union troops could "better operate for the double purpose of harassing the enemy and protecting Santa Fe from depredation." An officer had reported that the Texans at San Antonio (New Mexico) were weak, and the Coloradoan asserted that, such being the case, the troops under his command would be "sufficient to control their action and to defeat them in case of an attack." In concluding his reply, Slough stated that he needed every available man and therefore he could not consent to leaving behind the troop units which Paul deemed necessary for the defense of Fort Union.⁶³

Deeply chagrined by Slough's reply, and "believing that the best interests of the Government demanded it," the commander of Fort Union once again addressed a note to the Coloradoan,⁶⁴ urging him to reconsider his decision and to submit to the plan of the departmental commander. Indignantly Paul stated that Slough must have been "aware that no part of the regular force of this district would have been turned over to . . . [him] had the instructions of Colonel Canby of the 16th instant been received twelve hours earlier." Again he stressed the fact that Slough's contemplated move was in direct conflict with Canby's orders and the possible attack upon the Texans at San Antonio was "most certainly" in violation. If that attack proved unsuccessful, it would result in "the entire loss of the Territory, at least for a time, and render its reconquest much more difficult." Paul pointed out that Canby must have had good reasons to change the plan he had at first approved, and his anxiety to have the change made known was indicated by his sending duplicates of his instructions by different messengers. "In the name of the department commander, of the best interests of the service, and of the safety of all the troops in this Territory," Paul implored Slough to reconsider his decision.⁶⁵

Colonel Slough, either because he did not have time or because he did not consider it worth his while, did not bother to answer

⁶³ Chapin to Paul, March 22, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 654.

⁶⁴ Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 652.

⁶⁵ Paul to Slough, March 22, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 655.

Paul's last letter. He had made up his mind to move southward and he had no intention of changing his plans. Paul was so upset that he wrote the Adjutant-General about the situation in order "to throw the responsibility of any disaster which . . . [might] occur on the right shoulders." Fearing the worst, Paul asked for reinforcements to the amount of 4,000 men and several batteries of the best cannon.⁶⁶

Governor Henry Connelly of New Mexico was fully aware of the "little discord in relation to the movement . . . from Union," but since he was anxious for offensive action against the Texans, he sided with Slough. Connelly reasoned that Slough's movement "would curtail the limits of the enemy, and mayhap lead to the expulsion of the enemy from the capital" which was now reported to be occupied by one hundred men with two pieces of artillery. Connelly averred that this "slight" difference of opinion between the two officers would "lead to no unfavorable result, as Colonel Slough . . . [would] advance upon the road that the enemy . . . [would] necessarily have to march to reach Union, should an attempt be made upon that place." Another reason for Connelly's stand that Slough's action was justified was his belief that the Texans were "preparing for a precipitate retreat from the Territory by way of Fort Stanton on the Pecos River." His stand was given credence by the fact that the Texans were making a "sudden and mercenary demand for money" from the inhabitants of the Territory. The Confederates had not "behaved with the moderation that was expected, and . . . desolation . . . marked their progress on the Rio Grande from Craig to Bernalillo. Exactions and confiscations . . . [were] of daily occurrence, and the larger portion of those who . . . [had] anything to give or to lose . . . left their houses and contents a prey to the invaders" and sought refuge within the Union lines. To Connelly this effort on the part of the Texans to secure as much money and goods as possible from the people was a clear indication that they were preparing to leave. Had the Confederates planned to remain in New Mexico, Connelly reasoned that they surely would not antagonize the native population in such a manner.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Paul to Adjutant-General, March 24, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 652-653.

⁶⁷ Connelly to Seward, March 23, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 651-652. Fort Stanton was evacuated by Federal forces shortly after the surrender of the garrison at Fort Fillmore. For a short period one of Baylor's companies occupied the post, but the Confederates soon left because of their lack of manpower and the relative unimportance of the post.

About noon of March 22 Colonel Slough and his command sallied forth from Fort Smith, leaving that post practically ungarrisoned. The column consisted of the First Regiment Colorado Volunteers, 916 men; Captain W. H. Lewis' battalion of the Fifth Infantry and Captain James H. Ford's independent Colorado company, 191 men; Captain George H. Howland's detachment of the First and Third Cavalry, 160 men; Captain John F. Ritter's battery of four guns, 53 men; and Lieutenant Ira W. Claflin's battery of four small howitzers, 32 men. Slough's combined force consisted of 1,342 men.⁶⁸

Continuing on the main road to Santa Fe, a detachment under Major Chivington engaged in a successful skirmish with the advance guard of the "Sibley Brigade" on March 26. Two days later at the battle of Glorieta, Slough's main column clashed with a large force of Texans commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William R. Scurry. Before the battle, Slough had divided his forces, and Major Chivington was sent with a detachment to circle to the Confederate rear. In the main battle the "Pike's Peakers" were driven from the field. The day was not lost, however, for Chivington's force arrived at the rear area where the Texans had drawn up their supply wagons. Swooping down upon the few unsuspecting defenders, Chivington and his men succeeded in destroying the whole train of some eighty wagons. The Texans may have won the battle of Glorieta, but due to Chivington's action, they had lost the victory.⁶⁹

Upon hearing the news of Slough's impetuous advance, Canby considered that officer's conduct a breach of his orders. Rather than face a court-martial, Colonel Slough resigned his commission and left the Territory. His place was filled by the popular Major Chivington. The forces of Canby and those in the northern department now united and were able to drive the Texans from the land.

The destruction of the Confederate supply train had been a deciding factor which caused Sibley to abandon New Mexico. Supplies had been scarce enough as it was, but the loss of the eighty wagons of vital necessities convinced the Texans that continuance of the campaign was untenable. The timely arrival of the Colorado

⁶⁸ Slough to Adjutant-General, March 30, 1862, *O. R. A.*, IX, 534.

⁶⁹ Bancroft, *Arizona and New Mexico*, 694-97.

Volunteers and the bold actions of Colonel John P. Slough and Major John M. Chivington had saved New Mexico for the Union.⁷⁰

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⁷⁰ An expeditionary force under the command of Colonel James H. Carleton set out from California to drive the Texans from New Mexico. When the "California Column" arrived at the Rio Grande, the Confederates had already retreated from the Territory. This episode is briefly treated in Hubert H. Bancroft, *History of California*, VII, San Francisco, 1890. A more detailed account is found in George H. Pettis, *The California Column*, Santa Fe, 1908.

Rival Urban Communication Schemes for the Possession of the Northwest Trade, 1783-1800

Students of American History have had difficulty writing about the city because they have consciously or unconsciously accepted the tendency of other students of the urban phenomena outside the field to view corporate entities as fictitious persons and to accept non-human explanations for the city's causation, generative dynamics and motivation. Typical of this approach outside the field of history is the statement of Ernest W. Burgess:

The new community, the modern city is, as we know, the product of the machine. . . . It was the economic utility of the machine rather than man's desire that brought together great aggregates of workers in the process of mass production and so created the city.¹

This neuterism in approach is reflected in the work of some of the better students of history either by a semi-biographical approach to the writing of the history of cities² or by the resort to a running segmented chronology whose only synthesis is to be found in a compound of statistics and customs held together by a rationalized scope.³

¹ Ernest W. Burgess, "The New Community and Its Future," *The Annals*, CXLIX, part 1 (May, 1930), 157. "Cities have been able to support their large populations because of the presence of the great basic employment units—factories. . . . Cities are also the centers of great service institutions. . . ." John F. Cuber, ed., *Sociology*, New York, 1947, 350. "Howard Woolston distinguishes the modern from the ancient city by the turning point of the Industrial Revolution, which brought about the remarkable urban concentration of the present day." Howard W. Odum, *Understanding Society, The Principles of Dynamic Sociology*, New York, 1947, 319-320.

² George Sessions Perry, *Cities of America*, New York, 1947, *passim*; George R. Leighton, *America's Growing Pains: The Romance, Comedy and Tragedy of Five Great Cities*, New York, 1939, *passim*. Cf. Elmer T. Peterson, *Cities are Abnormal*, Norman, Oklahoma, 1946.

³ Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in America, 1625-1742*, New York, 1938, pp. v, vi, vii; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Rise of the City, 1878-1898*, New York, 1933, 79, 80 *et passim*; Arthur M. Schlesinger, "The City in American History," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVII, No. 1 (June, 1940), 43-66; Allan Nevins, "The Rise of the City . . . by Arthur Meir Schlesinger . . .," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXI, No. 1 (June, 1934), 108-109.

Bridenbaugh did not believe cities "to have been solely the product of nineteenth century industrialism, but rather to have germinated with the earliest settlement on American soil." Schlesinger continues in this vein by asserting that "as the larger American towns gained in corporate consciousness, THEY reached out for dependent territories and engaged in

Regardless of field, students of urbanism have always recognized that the city was a concentration point for many dynamic factors and forces.⁴ They have produced in one form or another reliable accounts either of the city's specialized functions or the actions of many of its significant population segments.⁵ This writing is suggesting that if the premise "Cities are the focal points in the occupation and utilization of the earth by man,"⁶ be accepted, greatest attention in the historical treatment of the urban phenomena should be centered upon human desire in delineating generative and motivating forces and human impulses in accounting for urban activity.

Under this approach a city becomes a locally, highly concentrated association of human beings internally divisible into dynamic ethnic, economic, religious or other groups, each with a positive consciousness of group interest, discipline and leadership.⁷ Naturally those groups that possess the means and skill for effective "occupation and utilization" would acquire a position of leadership superior to that of other groups in this plural society, and their aspirations are apt either to dominate the urban scene or strongly influence others existing therein. Alliances or liaisons of varying tenure between the possessors of entrepreneurial skill and capital and those useful

contest with one another for economic dominance." This statement in the *Review* followed Allan Nevins critique on Schlesinger's book to the effect that "at every turn he is hampered by his inability to cite economic causes for social results, or describe economic results from social causes."

⁴ Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness*, pp. v & vi; H. W. Odum & H. E. Moore, *American Regionalism*, New York, 1938, 113, 119; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *loc cit*, 49; "In its confines were focused all of the new economic forces: . . ." Arthur M. Schlesinger, *Rise of the City*, 79-80; "The large cities of the United States represent a concentration of people, finance, industry, power and the arts, and reflect the process of urbanization as a way of life symbolic of what has been sought under the name of civilization," Odum, *Understanding Society*, 323; C. D. Harris and Edward L. Ullman, "The Nature of Cities," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 242 (November, 1945), 7-12.

⁵ Robert G. Albion & J. B. Pope, *The Rise of New York Port*, New York, 1939; Robert G. Albion, *Square Riggers on Schedule* . . . Princeton, 1938; J. B. Bishop, *A Chronicle of One Hundred and Fifty Years: The Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, 1768-1918*, New York, 1918; Margaret G. Myers, *The New York Money Market*, Vol. I, New York, 1931.

Enlightening accounts of special interest groups identifiable with urbanism may be found in Robert A. Brady, *Business As a System of Power*, New York, 1943; Philip S. Foner, *Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict*, Chapel Hill, 1941; Ferdinand Lundberg, *America's Sixty Families*, New York, 1938; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson*, Boston, 1945.

⁶ Harris and Ullman, "The Nature of Cities," *loc. cit.*, 7.

⁷ George Ruble Woolfolk, "The Cotton Regency: The Northern Merchants and Reconstruction, 1865-1880," Mss Thesis, The University of Wisconsin, 1947, ch. 1 *et passim*.

in the production of goods and services account for both the solidarity and the basic character of the city. The interaction of these groups in the projection of their aspirations generates much of the internal growth and external outreach of the city. Therefore studies of urban rivalry, properly developed, clearly reveal group aspirations and the anatomy of projection to achieve the goal.

Frederick Jackson Turner pointed out that "For many years the three eastern sections conceived of the west as merely an emanation of themselves, and regarded it as a battle field in the struggle for power between the original sections, the raw materials where-with political and economic, and even religious preponderance could be built up."⁸ Though Callender indicated years ago that "the interest which the seaboard cities felt in the Western trade before 1815 was aroused more by the prospects of future development than by its actual importance,"⁹ it is significant that the tactics and strategy of this struggle were planned and executed by men in the major seaboard cities. The projected schemes for the possession of the northwest trade may have been premature, but the schemers and the schemes clearly follow a pattern of urban imperialism, the dynamics of which have changed only in degree and not in kind.¹⁰

The generation and projection of the economic aspirations of a group or groups in the city depends vitally upon the challenge presented by the nature and the accessibility of a form of wealth which the group or groups in question have the initiative and/or the capacity to exploit. Major economic aspirations and activity of early America were centered in the occupation and exploitation of the soil. As people filled up the land from the seaboard, the Northwest in its turn came within the interest of aggressive entrepreneurs. Geographically, urban schemers in New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia-Maryland were the only ones, despite the charter land claims of others, with direct access to the northwest. Time was to demonstrate that New York had the best natural path inland.¹¹ Pennsylvania¹² and Virginia-Maryland,¹³ while not fa-

⁸ Frederick J. Turner, *The Significance of Sections in American History*, New York, 1932, 197.

⁹ Guy Stevens Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States, 1765-1860*, Boston, c. 1909, 271.

¹⁰ "Projects in American History and Culture," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXI, No. 4 (March, 1945), 519.

¹¹ A. B. Hulbert, *The Paths of Inland Commerce*, New Haven, 1920, 16; *Supplement to the Annual Report of the State Engineer and Surveyor of the State of New York for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1905*, Albany, 1906, 15.

¹² *Journal of the First Session of the House of Representatives of*

vored geographically in the same way, had some rather real advantages in the approaches to the inland gates. George Washington understood that the region beyond the mountains was naturally drained by the Ohio-Mississippi Rivers into the entrepôt of New Orleans, and correctly predicted the path of the "proceeds."¹⁴

Accessibility, as significant as it is, is often conditioned by initiative, collective or individual, shown by those whose fortunes lay in the lap of high politics. Conflicting charter claims by the colonies and the necessities of empire regulation had done much to frustrate the ambitions of land speculators with their companies down to the Revolution.¹⁵ Projectors of the Indiana, Vandalia and the Illinois Wabash Land Companies were prominent in the infighting that placed western land across the path of Confederation¹⁶ and abandoned somewhat their faith in political solutions only after Jefferson's ordinances made such activity pointless.

The turning to solutions that were orientated to economics more

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Beginning Tuesday, December 7, 1790, Philadelphia, 1790, 201; Hulbert, Paths of Inland Commerce, 17.

¹³ Elbert J. Benton, *The Wabash Trade Route in the Development of the Old Northwest, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Sciences*, XXI, No. 1 & 2, (1903), 36, n. 17; A. B. Hulbert, *Washington and the West*, New York, 1905, 86-88; Hulbert, *Paths of Inland Commerce*, 18-19.

¹⁴ Hulbert, *Washington and the West*, 102; Emory R. Johnson, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, 2 Vols. Carnegie Institute Publication No. 215A, The Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington, 1915, 207. In the middle 1790's pork, flour, grain and whiskey were freighted by flat-boat to New Orleans. After disposal of both cargo and boat, the owner often returned by sea to Philadelphia or Baltimore where a supply of merchandise was obtained, and the six month journey was completed into the western region by horseback or wagon. Johnson records that goods worth more than one million dollars were received at New Orleans from up the river in 1799; cf. Lewis Cecil Gray and E. R. Thompson, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860*, The Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington, 1933, 869-70.

¹⁵ T. P. Abernethy, *Western Lands and the American Revolution* Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, Monograph No. 25, The University of Virginia, New York, 1937, Chapters XXI & XXVI; S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution, 1764-1788 and the Formation of the Federal Constitution*, Oxford, 1923, II; Hulbert, *Washington and the West*, 9 et passim. Washington had been in the organization of the Mississippi Company in 1763, and before the Revolution held by patent 30,000 acres and by survey 10,000 acres. 10,000 of the 30,000 acres were on the Ohio and the rest were on the Great Kanawha.

¹⁶ H. B. Adams, *Maryland's Influence Upon Land Cessions to the United States, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, 3rd Series, vol. III, No. 1 (1885), passim; Turner, 112; Robert A. East, *Business Enterprise in the American Revolutionary Era* Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, No. 439, New York, 1938, 315-316; Hulbert, *The Ohio Company, 1786-1795: Records of the Original Proceedings of the Ohio Company* Marietta College Historical Collections, vol. I & II, Marietta, Ohio, 1917.

than politics provides a clear picture of the anatomy of urban aggression. The first factor in such a consideration is the origin and nature of urban aspirations. The self-produced leadership of a group often creates, symbolizes or verbalizes an aspiration commonly held by the group or one to which the group by the nature of its component may easily subscribe. The schemes for the exploitation of the trade of the northwest are a good example of this.

Virginia's attention, along with that of Maryland, to the possibilities of draining the trade of the Northwest through their leading urban centers was to be called by George Washington. Before the revolution was formally over Washington left his camp at Newburg, New York, to make a three weeks tour up the Mohawk river into central New York to take a general view of that path of empire.¹⁷ Returning he wrote from Princeton, October 12, 1783, to Chevalier de Chastellux concerning his impressions as follows:

I could not help taking a more extensive view of the vast inland navigation of the United States and could not but be struck by the immense extent and importance of it, and of the goodness of that Providence which has dealt its favors to us with so profuse a hand. Would to God we may have wisdom enough to improve them. I shall not rest content 'till I have explored the western country and traversed those lines, or a great part of them, which have given bounds to a new empire.¹⁸

Glean as one may whatever elements of the "First in peace—" tradition are bound up in this statement, it is hardly conceivable that Washington did not know of the battle to dispossess his native state going on at that time on the floor of the Congress of the Confederation and in Europe of her claims in the Northwest. Probably he knew of Virginia's intention to cede the territory north of the Ohio. What then must have been his feelings when his mind went beyond his gaze up the Mohawk and conceived the advantage that nature had placed in the hands of Virginia's old rival. Indeed so disturbed was he that the following year, 1784, he turned down an opportunity, perhaps the last of his lifetime, to visit Europe as the man who brought the arrogant Briton to terms, to make his famous tour of the West, avowedly for looking after his western estates, but actually to find a route to counteract the advantage of New York.¹⁹ Having secured along with Clinton, who made the

¹⁷ Hulbert, *Washington and The West*, 7.

¹⁸ Andrew Stewart, Report on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal in 1826, Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, 19th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 228, 2; Adams, *Maryland's Influence on Land Cessions*, 82-83 for a critical estimate of Washington's comment.

¹⁹ Adams, *Maryland's Influence on Land Cessions*, 84, f. n. 1.

trip through New York with him, six thousands acres on the Mohawk, Washington was to remark: "I know the Yorkers will delay no time to remove every obstacle in the way of the other communication so soon as the post of Oswego and Niagara are surrendered."

Washington was interested in improving the Potomac before the Revolution and had requested that Jefferson confer with Thomas Johnson, former Governor of Maryland, on the subject as Johnson had been a warm promoter of the Potomac scheme also before the Revolution. Furthermore Jefferson, in a letter to James Madison in 1783, had pointed out the advisability of ceding the land south of the Ohio immediately.²⁰ Jefferson thought that it was to Virginia's interest to cede the Kentucky region as this would be a way to keep communication with Indiana, Greenbriar and surrounding territories. Jefferson reasoned that these lands would be thickly populated and the improvement of the Potomac river would afford "the shortest water communication by five hundred miles of any which can ever be got between the western waters and the Atlantic and of course promise us almost a monopoly of the western and Indian trade."

Apt as Jefferson's analysis of the situation appeared, Washington's trip to the west in 1784 gave him new insight. Using Detroit as a point of departure, Washington was convinced that the Potomac river was the natural last leg of the closest route to the heart of the northwest.²¹ Facing the major drawback in this idea George Washington observed:

It may be said perhaps, that as the most direct routes from the lakes to the navigation of the Potomac are through the state of Pennsylvania—and the interest of that state opposed to the extension of the waters of the Monongahela, that a communication cannot be had either by the Yohiogany or Cheat rivers; but herein I differ. An application to this purpose would in my opinion, place the legislature of that commonwealth in a very delicate situation. . . .²²

Washington knew that there were at least one hundred thousand souls west of Laurel Hill burdened with long overland travel and wanted an extension of inland navigation to Philadelphia. What if they did not get it? Said Washington: "They will seek a mart elsewhere; and none is so convenient as that which offers itself through the Yohioganny or Cheat rivers." What would result if

²⁰ Turner, *Significance of Sections*, 115.

²¹ Hulbert, *Washington and the West*, 86 et passim.

²² *Ibid.*

Pennsylvania sought to impede this natural flow of commerce? Thought Washington:

The certain consequence therefore of an attempt to restrain the extension of the navigation of these rivers (so consonant with the interest of these people) or to impose any extra duties upon the exports or imports to or from another state, would be a separation of the western settlers from the old and more interior government; toward which there is not wanting a disposition at this moment in the former.

Whatever Washington was in national politics he was certainly provincial in his economics; but it was urbanly inspired and typical of the spirit of the age. The leading commercial centers of Maryland and Virginia had acquired an aspiration. Late in 1783 and early in 1784 Virginia and Maryland respectively accepted the idea of Washington and the suggestion of Governor Harrison by chartering jointly the Potomac Company.²³

Associated capitalists in Albany and New York City acquired their aspiration in much the same way as did those of Alexandria, Richmond and Baltimore. As events were to prove, Washington was right about the "Yorkers."²⁴ New Yorkers, like Virginians, had an interest in improving the waterways of the state that dated back before the Revolution. The New York Assembly on November 3, 1784, and the Senate on November 8 received a petition of Christopher Colles proposing a plan of inland navigation on the Mohawk river. Mr. Adgate of the Assembly committee reporting asserted that Colles' idea ought to be encouraged, but not at govern-

²³ Albert Gallatin, "Roads and Canals," *American State Papers; Documents, Legislative and Executive of the Congress of the United States from the First Session of the First to the Second Session of the Tenth Congress inclusive Commencing March 3, 1789, and Ending March 3, 1809*. X, Doc. No. 250, Washington, 1834, *passim*; Elkanah Watson, *History of the Rise, Progress, and Existing Condition of the Western Canals in the State of New York From September, 1788, to the Completion of the Middle Section of the Grand Canal in 1819 . . .*, Albany, 1820, 87; Alvin Fay Harlow, *Old Towpaths, The Story of the American Canal Era*, New York, 1926, 12.

The James river company was no doubt the more favored of the two river improvements, perhaps because Richmond sat on its banks and because it reached out to the great Kanawha toward the Ohio. Yet the two projects were often legislated upon together. See generally *A Collection of All Acts and Parts of Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia From October 1784, down to the Session of 1829-30 Inclusive Relating to the James River Company—Together with an Appendix Containing the Regulations of the President and Directors of said Company for the Superintendence and Preservation of the Improvements Under their Direction*, Richmond, 1830; hereinafter cited *James River Company Acts*.

²⁴ On the question of which state led in internal improvement ideas or who had the original idea for the Erie canal see the statement in the *Supplement to the Annual Report of the State Engineer & Surveyor of the State of New York*, 15 *et passim*.

ment expense. Colles had suggested that the scheme be carried out by private enterprise in the first place and only wanted a state charter with the monopoly rights that usually went therewith. However, the improvident Irish engineer, who had come to America before the Revolution, was to pester the lawgivers of the Empire State all during '85 and '86 with petitions for money for surveys, to say nothing of the good people of the state with lectures and pamphlets on a proposition they considered visionary.

Christopher Colles' project failed doubtless for the want of subscribers; yet the New York Assembly journal of March 17, 1786, throws some light on the measure of the man:

Mr. Jeffrey Smith moved for leave to bring in a bill entitled "An Act for Improving the Navigation of the Mohawk River, Wood Creek, and the Onandaga River with a view of opening an inland navigation to Oswego, and for extending the same if practicable to Lake Erie."²⁵

It is unimportant that nothing ever came of Colles or the Smith Bill. The idea was there and the path of the "Yorkers" attempt to get to the west was marked.

Then came Elkanah Watson. This globe-trotting New Englander who made his home in New York had visited Washington at Mount Vernon in 1785.²⁶ While he could not forget Washington's sending his faithful Negro servant Billy with a warming pan for his cold bed, neither could he forget that Washington's

mind was intently settled on a project of connecting the western waters, by canals, with his favorite Potomac, and of improving the navigation of the Monongahelo and other branches of the Ohio, principally with the view of diverting the fur trade from Detroit to Alexander . . . also the produce of those vast intervening countries which lie as yet in a state of nature.

1788 found Watson back in New York state to see what the state's possibilities were. Standing on the eminence at Fort Stanwix (Rome) which divides the St. Lawrence and the Mohawk water systems Watson conceived

"the idea of the practicability of counteracting at least by a fair competition the favorite plan Washington was then pursuing, with zeal and ardour, to allure all the trade of the western regions connected with the Ohio and the great lakes, even the fur trade from Detroit to Alexandria."

Governor George Clinton in a speech to the Assembly January 5, 1791, voiced the same idea thus:

²⁵ The "Smith" bill was the result of another Colles petition in the same session.

²⁶ Watson, *History of Western Canals*, 8.

Our frontier settlements, freed from apprehensions of danger, are rapidly increasing and must soon yield extensive resources for profitable commerce; this consideration forcibly recommends the policy of continuing to facilitate the means of communication with them... as to prevent the produce of those fertile districts from being diverted to other markets.²⁷

On March 24, 1791, New York passed her first canal law entitled "An Act Concerning Roads and Inland Navigation" authorizing the following of the path Colles had suggested.

With geography on their side after the land cessions, entrepreneurs of Pennsylvania were not to be left out of the race to the west. Historic Fort Pitt, formerly one of the keys to France's American empire, stood within the confines of the state. There was the Juniata finger of the Susquehanna reaching toward the fingers of the Allegheny, the main body of which lay toward French Creek and Presqu'île on Lake Erie. Besides this the leading commercial city on the Atlantic was Philadelphia and this town was blessed with some of the best financial brains the nation afforded. Robert Morris, "Financier of the Revolution," was president of the "Society for Promoting the Improvement of Roads and Inland Navigation" and thus was in vanguard of those who led Pennsylvanians into the fray.²⁸

Pennsylvanians, too, had a pre-revolutionary record for canal building which, it must be admitted, seems more practical than that of any of their competitors.²⁹ Yet, after the Revolution Pennsylvanians had let these ideas slumber until in 1791 their society on Navigation improvement called attention to the states' possibilities thus:

If we turn our view to the immense territories connected with the Ohio and Mississippi waters and bordering on the great lakes it will appear... that our communication with those vast countries (considering Fort Pitt as the port of entrance upon them) is as easy and may be rendered as cheap as to another port on the Atlantic tide waters.³⁰

Here, again, Pennsylvanians were sensible. They were willing to concede the draining of the wealth of the Ohio basin to the Potomac; yet both the society and the legislative committee that favorably reported their idea were confident that the trade of the lake region

²⁷ *Supplement to the Annual Report of the State Engineer & Surveyor of the State of New York*, 28.

²⁸ *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250.

²⁹ John L. Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems in the United States*, Philadelphia, 1888, 44.

³⁰ *American State Papers*, X Doc. 250—February 7, 1791.

and beyond into Wisconsin would be theirs, "at a period not very remote, unless, by a faulty timidity, or illiberal parsimony, we should ingloriously leave so noble an undertaking to our more enterprising posterity." An old aspiration had come to life with greater fervor.³¹

Schemes as grandiose as these would naturally require considerable capital. If the land is to be occupied and utilized schemers must turn to the cities and like-minded men of their ilk in the natural concentration points for this second important factor, capital. The projects of this period reveal the influence of the merchant, because the funds, the men, and the purposes were predominantly commercial in nature.

The revival of plans antedating the Revolution for canal construction brought capital from many sources. Dutch financiers, interested in America through war time business, participated in the Potomac Company, the Western Inland Lock Company of New York, and a Connecticut River Improvement Company project in 1780's and 90's.³² State assistance often was obtained for these schemes, and merchants, who were naturally interested, provided large amounts of the domestic private capital involved. William Hartshorne and John Fitzgerald of Alexandria, merchants and organizers of the bank there several years later, were among the original officers of the Potomac Company in 1785. The Washington connection as President of both the Potomac and the James river schemes loosened the purse-strings of many a tight-fisted investor.

Robert Morris of Philadelphia was eager to invest in the James and Potomac River companies, subsequently heading similar organizations in Pennsylvania where merchants had longed for internal improvements and where his name because of his Revolutionary

³¹ *Journal of the First Session of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Beginning Tuesday, December 7, 1790, February 19, 1791. Monday, April 4, 1791; As late as 1796, Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania, on the completion of the Wood Creek Mohawk connection, addressed his Legislature thus: "Permit me earnestly to recommend a liberal perseverance in extending and facilitating a communication between different parts of this state, by roads and canals. Indeed the spirited example which your predecessors gave, has excited in one of our sister states an emulation so active, as to demand some extraordinary exertions on our part, to retain a just portion of the benefits arising from an intercourse with the lakes and the western waters to which our local position and other natural advantages have justly entitled us." Watson, History of the Western Canals, 102.*

³² East, *Business Enterprise*, 307 et passim; *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250.—Note the names of the directors in the charters.

services commanded such a high degree of public confidence.³³ Morris and his business associates William Bingham and Thomas FitzSimons were among the first of more than two thousand persons to apply for shares in the Lancaster Turnpike in 1792. Bingham became the first president of the corporation, and FitzSimons and Tench Coxe were also officers. Morris also helped secure subscriptions for New York's Inland Navigation companies in 1792.

The chief credit for promoting the New York schemes goes to Elkanah Watson, Philip Schuyler, Goldsbroow Bonyar, and Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, founders and directors of the Albany bank.³⁴ Barent Bleeker of an old New York family, and also among the organizers of the Albany bank, was the Navigation Company's first treasurer. New York City's business men were of course interested in such plans, which would benefit their port, a situation not true at the time of the Erie. James Watson, war commissary, New York broker and friend of Elkanah Watson, was among the first to support the canal companies in 1792,³⁵ while Nicholas Hoffman, a gentleman of an important colonial family, took subscriptions for them in the city. Nicholas Law, Dominick Lynch, James Watson and "probably John Watts," two old and new financial figures in the city, subsequently became directors of either the Northern or Western Inland Lock Navigation companies. Abraham Ten Broeck and Cornelius Glen, Albany merchants and Bank Officials of old Dutch stock, served in a similar capacity. Among the many subscribers to the companies were Geract W. Van Schaick, cashier of the Albany Bank and many New York City persons of varied social origins and financial interest, such as merchants Le Roy and Bayard and George Scriba; Lawyers Rufus King and Richard Harson; gentlemen Gilbert Aspinwall and John Lawrence. The newly prominent merchant, Comfort Sands, directed a canal engineer to Schuyler.

The funds for these enterprises were secured by stock issues authorized by the state legislatures. Rarely were anything like all of the subscriptions for stock paid in or all of the stock subscribed. Besides, the stock bore no definite face value and the holders thereof might be called on for more and more money.³⁶ Funds could be

³³ Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems*, 44. Note that Timothy Matlock and Tench Francis were Secretary and Treasurer respectively of the Susquehanna-Schuylkill scheme Morris headed.

³⁴ Watson, *History of Western Canals*, 4-22.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 85-86.

³⁶ See *Charters in American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250; *Supplement to the Annual Report of the State Engineer & Surveyor of the State of New York*, 36 et passim; *James River Acts*, passim.

supplemented from the tolls of the project, if any; and if all else failed there was always the state to take up the slack. The charters also called for subscription payments in gold or silver or Spanish milled dollars.³⁷

Despite the banking connections of the New York schemers, their companies' charters prohibited their establishing a bank and, interestingly enough, held the capital down, both fixed and liquid, to "just enough for present debts and purposes." Initial sums for were often raised by a state authorized lottery, the proceeds from which were pocketed by the companies after the awards were made.³⁸ Financing by lotteries was no unmixed blessing and the results were never predictable.

Internal growth or external rivalry presents, as does the need for capital, a creative challenge to the urban entrepreneur. Here he shows a capacity either for ingenious adaptability or inspired originality in creating patterns of business organizations sufficiently flexible to bring aspiration into reality. The Potomac scheme, in particular, was quite unique.³⁹ The company not only received a charter from Virginia but from Maryland as well, "and was the first of the interstate commercial corporations since so common." As it has been so well said: "Here were the same individuals sustaining similar political relations to different governments, constituted in each an artificial person, dealing under one name with property in each and amenable in each to the supervision of its authorities."⁴⁰ Interstate incorporation was not general practice, especially after the Constitution of the United States was ratified. It was thought that article one, section ten of that instrument prohibited such interstate "compacts," hence joint state incorporation was not to appear again until the third quarter of the nineteenth

³⁷ New York accepted her own bills of credit, bills of the Bank of the United States or of the Bank of New York.

³⁸ Tench Coxe, *A View of the United States of America... 1787-1794*. Philadelphia, 1794, 329. The lottery method was favored by Coxe for raising the \$500,000 necessary for the inland manufacturing town on the west bank of the Susquehanna. The Susquehanna-Schuylkill Company in 1793, when in financial straits, asked and secured a lottery from the Pennsylvania legislature. The experience of this company was typical; the lotteries were notoriously unreliable as sources of income.

³⁹ Simeon E. Baldwin, "American Business Corporations before 1789," *The American Historical Review*, VII, (April, 1903), 460-461.

⁴⁰ The Bank of North America, chartered by Pennsylvania and New York in 1782, preceded the Potomac Charter, but was not of exactly the same character. The Dismal Swamp Canal Company, chartered by Virginia in 1787 and North Carolina in 1790 is the same line with the Potomac project.

century.⁴¹ There was a fear of corporations in this period. As it has been so aptly observed in gauging popular reaction to this form of business organization: "As they reviewed their history in England, they saw that a monopoly had walked in the shadow of each. They were in their very nature the embodiments of special privileges."⁴² The communication projects were, in organization, monopolistic in nature; yet they were under such strict government regulation, and, as time demonstrated, were so dependent there-on that the sting of monopoly was dulled somewhat.

A good deal of power was, by the charter, lodged in the hands of the president and the board of directors; yet the stockholders were allowed considerable control.⁴³ This is important because it shows an evolution in the character of business organization in the period. Here clearly is a "partial change from the personally supervised investments in pre-war years to many with institutional management in 1792," a step distinctly "in the direction of impersonal and specialized capitalism."⁴⁴ This kind of economic institutional adaptation is possible in the urban scene when men of the city gather their resources to achieve some goal.

Valuable as aspirations, capital and business organization are in activating urban entrepreneurs, to be adept in government is a sine qua non of urban competitive imperialist. A creature of the state, and often with interest basically antagonistic thereto, city interest have to be identified with the public weal and translated into the law of the land. Only then can the entire process of setting the forces of "occupation and utilization" into motion be begun and the vast resources of the state be channeled and harnessed for particularistic urban ambitions and dreams, the scope of which often lying beyond the political boundaries of the state involved.

The right to grant a charter is the right to open the door to opportunity. This the states did to urban schemers. In all of the

⁴¹ Baldwin, "American Business Corporations," *loc. cit.*, 461, makes this assertion. George Mason in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had tried to get Congress the power to charter canal companies only to see the suggestion lost by a vote of eight states to three.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 464. Cf. Samuel Williston, "History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800," *Harvard Law Review*, II, No. 4, (November 15, 1888), *passim*. Note *Pennsylvania House Journal*, January 22, 1794, for the answer to a prayer against the Lancaster Road Company by the Legislative Committee on Petitions.

⁴³ *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250. Observations of the stipulations in the charters are the basis of this statement. The charters are so detailed and specific until it is difficult to determine what policy discretion the companies had.

⁴⁴ East, *Business Enterprise*, 306.

charters there were the same items on a strict regulation of tolls, the monopoly item, a strict regulation of officers and fiscal policy of the companies, and the time limit for the completion of the project. There were also the recurrent promise of appropriations to aid the companies either as loans, or mortgages on their works, or the purchase of stock.

The states assisted the companies further by extending to them its right of eminent domain. The charters and the legislation reveal that the state governments had no intention of letting anything stand in the way of the pet schemes of their urban entrepreneurs. In most instances the companies could condemn land within certain limits of the project, which limit was expanded gradually as necessity demanded. However, the legislatures provided in most instances for arbitration of conflicting claims by juries of impartial substantial property holders in the justice court of the vicinity. This was particularly true of minor's and non compos mentis property.⁴⁵ Withal the tendency of the legislatures was to expand the power of the companies in this respect.

Entrepreneurs also were able to persuade state solons that it was necessary to give special protection to their efforts to get funds. Legislation gave the companies the power to hail a delinquent subscriber into court to make him pay his pledged obligation. Pennsylvania and New York required simple forfeiture at law, if the subscriber did not pay, with the right of reselling the stock. Virginia had no intention of letting the subscriber off that easy. There was to be no foolishness about the Potomac and James River schemes, especially since the schemes were for the public good and the state's money was tied up in it. If the subscriber did not realize the gravity of his public duty, the company could take him to court.⁴⁶ The jury in such litigation was, by law, instructed to answer only two questions. Did the subscriber accept the responsibility? If so, had he met it? Interestingly enough, the burden of proof rested on the subscriber who was defendant in action, and not on the company where it should since the company was plaintiff in action. This is a definite indication of the determination of the state to give its chartered companies every protection within the spirit and letter of the law.

Urban schemers are seldom more successful than the level of

⁴⁵ *American State Papers* X, Doc. 250. Note the reservation on the use of the water in the canal for other than navigation purposes.

⁴⁶ *James River Company Acts*, 16. See Acts of 1787-1790.

technology they are able to command in their liaison with those useful in the production of goods and services in the urban scene will allow. Their schemes engender a universal enthusiasm which accounts for urban intergroup solidarity behind them and is responsible for overcoming many of the technical problems surrounding the execution of the project. However, urban aspiration often exceeds the knowledge to execute, presenting the necessity of a scramble for alternatives or adaptations of the original grand designs more in keeping with the reality of technical know-how. This was certainly true for the schemes for the possession of the Northwest trade, thus affording a provocative insight into pattern of inter-city rivalry.

The technology of the canal schemes demanded a series of navigable streams to be connected, and all of the early projects followed this pattern. It was not until the Erie that such projects were to cross long stretches of land and by viaducts across streams. The Susquehanna-Schuylkill project failure revealed that excessive labor cost was another important factor in canal technology, and there is a suggestion that labor scarcity effected the Potomac project.

Though there were canals in Europe, there seems to have been a shortage of canal engineers in the America's. Indeed most of the canals were started and the engineer hired after the project hit a snag. To this jaded age of specialization it is inconceivable that General Schuyler of New York should be allowed to direct the technical operation of two canal schemes for two years.⁴⁷ In 1795 Williams Weston, the English canal engineer, having lost his job on the Schuylkill-Susquehanna project, was hired by the "Yorkers" to straighten out the confusion at Little Falls. Pennsylvanians had found Weston most inadequate because he spent or estimated expenditures above actual cost.⁴⁸ James Rumsey, the boat builder who had never seen a canal before, was directing the work on the Potomac project at Great Falls. Let it be said to his credit that the blasting through solid rock there with black powder was considered a masterpiece in Europe at the time.

If the inadequacy of engineering personnel posed a problem, the nature of tools and materials posed even a greater problem. The excavating tools were very crude. The plow and shovel were about all they amounted to on the Potomac project and we may so reason

⁴⁷ *Supplement to the Annual Report of the State Engineer & Surveyor of the State of New York*, 37 et passim.

⁴⁸ *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250.

on the others. However, once the canal was dug there was the problem of the locks. The Potomac Project was to suffer from wooden locks that rotted. The locks of the New York project suffered from the same trouble and had to be replaced in 1802. Pennsylvanians used brick coped with stone on the Schuylkill-Susquehanna project, with what success is not known.

The cumulative effect of technological limitations soon makes itself obvious in urban imperialism. The Potomac project began in 1786 at Great Falls just above Washington with a labor force of two hundred men. Management and labor worked manfully only to complete by 1802, in the face of inexperience, lack of funds, floods and other difficulties, the locks around Great Falls; and to have to show in 1808 only five short canals between Washington and a point above Harper's Ferry, the longest of which being around Little Falls—three thousand eight hundred and fourteen yards—carrying navigation to the tide water.

Where indeed were the results to back the vaunted words of the charter of the two states, with their niggardly appropriation of six thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars each, empowering a company to open a road from the headwaters of the Potomac to either the Cheat or the Monongahela "as commissioners . . . shall find most convenient and beneficial to the western settlers." By 1800, indeed 1825 when the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company took over, the Potomac project was nothing like near Cumberland to even think of constructing a road therefrom or nothing like near consummating the dreams of its instigators. Washington was dead before the locks at Great Falls were opened.

Maryland investors, persuaded of the value of the Potomac design, were holding in 1807 the largest amount of the stock either in testimony of their faith or the commercial predicament of their state.⁴⁹ That the Potomac scheme might have been moving too slowly for Maryland's entrepreneurs is indicated when in 1787 the Legislature passed an act providing for the establishment of several turnpike roads from Baltimore to the western and northwestern part of the state as a means of "greatly reducing the price of land carriage of produce and merchandise, and raise the value of land in said country and considerably increase the commerce of the state."⁵⁰

⁴⁹ *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250. Maryland's shares 220, Virginia's, 70.

⁵⁰ Joseph Austin Durrenberger, *Turnpikes: A Study of the Toll Road Movement in the Middle Atlantic States and Maryland*. Valdosta, Maryland, 1931, 37; "Records do not show that the joint appropriation for the Potomac-Cheat road was ever used, Hulbert *Paths of Inland Commerce*, 33.

Between the years 1796 and 1801 there were five turnpike companies with ample authority to accomplish Maryland's schemers purpose. Apparently in 1804 this had not been reached as the preamble of an act of that year reveals. However, in 1805, the Baltimore-Reistertown road⁵¹ which was ere long to make Baltimore supreme even over Philadelphia, the commercial supremacy of which on the seaboard had not been questioned since a decade before the close of the colonial era, had materialized.

The "Yorkers" flying leap into their project soon encountered technological hardships. After Elkanah Watson's second journey to the Mohawk Valley with General Van Cortland, Stephen Bayard and Jeremiah Van Rensselaer in September of 1791, Watson placed his report thereof in the hands of Philip Schuyler, Revolutionary General and powerful Senator, who promised to give the project all aid. Favorable reports by the Commissioners of the Land Office and the passing of the Williams Bill by both houses of the Legislature was to receive the blessings of the Council of Revision March 30, 1792.⁵² By the "Act for Establishing and Opening Lock Navigation within this State" two companies were incorporated, the "Western" and "Northern Inland Lock Navigation Company."⁵³

With Philip Schuyler as president and engineer the work began in April of 1793 at Little Fall. However, not until 1796-97 was the link between Woods Creek and the Mohawk completed. Here again is the familiar story of inexperience, no funds and a tremendous task. By 1798 the project had only reached Lake Oneida.

The survey of a route between Lake Ontario and Erie by the Niagara river in 1796 was begun by a group of men.⁵⁴ Thus in 1798 the Niagara Canal Company was incorporated by the legislature with James Watson as president. The company was authorized to construct a canal from Stedman's landing above the falls to a point opposite Queenstown below. This project never materialized. This failure not only discouraged canal projects, but could have affected the road projects as well.⁵⁵

⁵¹ *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250.

⁵² It should be noted that many friends of the project opposed the bill because they did not think it went far enough.

⁵³ *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250.

⁵⁴ *Supplement to the Annual Report of the State Engineer and Surveyor of the State of New York*, 44, 60-61.

⁵⁵ Benjamin DeWitt, "A Sketch of the Turnpike Roads in the State of New York," *Transactions of the Society of Useful Arts in the State of New York*, II, Albany, 1807, 190-204; *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250.

Pennsylvanians were also forced into an alternative for a canal project. The plan which the Society for Promoting the Improvement of Roads and Inland Navigation proposed involved the improvement of water and land routes by way of the Delaware to Lake Ontario and Lake Otsego, and of eight routes by the Susquehanna drainage, north, northwest and west. The Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation Company was incorporated September 29, 1791, to connect Reading on the Schuylkill and Middleton on the Susquehanna; and the Delaware-Schuylkill Canal Company was chartered April 10, 1792, as the first leg of this path to the west.⁵⁶

In spite of the fact that Robert Morris led Pennsylvania's projects, making them seem to be the leading canal schemes of the country, the companies were compelled to suspend their operations in 1794 after an outlay of four hundred forty thousand dollars. This failure was to discourage such schemes for years to come; and not until 1821, when the Erie was nearing completion, was this idea taken up again under the name "Union Canal."

Pennsylvanians were not without an alternative. The Legislature in 1792 incorporated a company to construct an "Artificial" road from Philadelphia to Lancaster, a distance of sixty-seven and one-half miles, to be known as "The Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Company."⁵⁷ Road building had technically, though simply, advanced. Macadam and Telford had only begun to show the people of England how to build roads of crushed stone—an art first developed by the French engineer Tresaguet—when Pennsylvanians built the Lancaster Turnpike. That road was thirty-seven feet wide, twenty-four feet of which were laid with stone. By December 24, 1795 the "road from Lancaster to the west side of the Schuylkill was complete and in full operation."⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ringwalt, 44. Note also the sums spent in this work. For a more detailed analysis see *Pennsylvania House Journal* for 1793, Secretary of the Commonwealth A. J. Dallas' Report, Appendix Book "B" XXI, XXXVIII. These may be a bit confusing. Therefore it is suggested that the "Abstract" statement on the contracts for opening and improving Roads and Rivers to be found in the *Pennsylvania Senate Journal*, 1807, Appendix, pp. 3-17 as the most usable. This report shows that the Keystone state always favored roads over water communication for each year 1791-1800; and that fewer road contracts were put in suit because of lack of completion in proportion to the number of contracts granted than river contracts by the Attorney General.

⁵⁷ Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems*, 29; *American State Papers*, X, Doc. 250.

⁵⁸ *Pennsylvania House Journal 1802-03*. This report by the President and Managers is very interesting and should be carefully read. The company, through its president Elliston Perot, intimates, against a wealth of historical writing to the contrary, that the road was not paying. The significant fact was that it was at least finished.

Lancaster was considered in 1800 "the largest inland town in the United States."⁵⁹ Well might Tench Coxe talk of inland manufacturing centers on the west bank of the Susquehanna as an internal market to supply the west,⁶⁰ for the road to Lancaster had put Pennsylvanians in striking distance. Quaker schemers were not through. In 1798 Abraham Witner was granted the right to erect a bridge over the Conestogo river near Lancaster which formed a part of the line of the turnpike. In the same year there was incorporated a company to build a bridge over the Schuylkill river at Market street, by which a direct and convenient entrance into Philadelphia from the eastern terminus of the turnpike might be made. This bridge cost three hundred thousand dollars, and at the time of its completion in 1801 was the most important work of its kind in the United States.⁶¹ The big two or three ton Conestoga wagons, drawn by ten horses and freighted with hats, boots, powder, lead, and clothing, rolled from Philadelphia into the gateways to the western country.

To see the city as the focal point in the occupation and utilization of the earth by man—to see it as a cell where capital and entrepreneurial skill are concentrated—to see the possessors of that skill and capital allied with other groups in this plural society to gather and create wealth and an aggressive cultural milieu is to see the possibilities of writing the entire history of America from the urban approach. Determinism at best must be handled with care in historical analysis. But he will be blind indeed who cannot see the march of progress across this continent from one cell of entrepreneurial skill and capital to another—that however intrepid the coonskin cap pioneer was, behind him were the men of the counting house and supply to make his deeds possible.

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⁵⁹ P. W. Bidwell and John Falconer, *History of Agriculture in the Northern United States, 1620-1860*, Carnegie Institution of Washington Publication No. 358, Washington, 1925, 132.

⁶⁰ Tench Coxe, *A View of the United States* . . . 327 *et passim*.

⁶¹ Length: 750 feet; width: 42 feet.

Book Reviews

Peasant Society in the Colombian Andes: A Sociological Study of Saucio.

By Orlando Fals-Borda. University of Florida Press, Gainesville, Florida, 1955. Pp. xii, 277. Illustrated. \$5.00.

Orlando Fals-Borda is a young Colombian who received his Ph.D. degree in sociology at the University of Florida. His book is the first thorough work on the rural sociology of Colombia and represents a significant contribution to social science. More Latin Americans should be encouraged to make sociological and anthropological studies of their native lands.

In his own words the author has attempted to present an objective, sociological study of peasants living in the Colombian village of Saucio whose society typifies the "very real backwardness encountered in rural areas." His ultimate purposes are "to facilitate the future task of codification, analysis, and synthesis of Colombia's rural realities, and to help implement a plan to make Saucio and all its counterparts in Colombia the progressive communities that they may well become."

Utilizing the best sociological technique, Fals-Borda collected statistics on nearly everything in Saucio including the percentage of peasants who owned umbrellas and flashlights. When he leaves his statistics behind the author presents a penetrating insight into the Colombian peasant's way of life. Fals-Borda's intimate descriptions of the peasant's religion, family and personality show that he knew the people of Saucio very well indeed.

Passive and resigned are the terms the author uses to describe the ethos of Saucio. He deplors the cultural backwardness which causes peasants to remain content with their lot of illiteracy and poverty. Fals-Borda attributes the "stagnant" condition of peasant society in large part to the conservative influence of the Roman Catholic Church which promises salvation to those who accept their earthly sufferings and fulfill their ritual obligations. He urges church leaders to teach the peasants to strive for a better life and warns political leaders to correct injustices in peasant communities before a class struggle develops. The Colombian sociologist sees hope in the fact that some peasants "through the recognition of their oppressive conditions, are slowly developing an adequate sense of social injustice."

Fals-Borda's entire theoretical argument rests on the premise that the Western concept of progress should constitute a universal goal for all peoples. Belief in progress developed in Europe in the eighteenth century and became an article of liberal faith in the nineteenth century. As Kroeber has pointed out, the concept of progress today has the force of an a-priori assumption in Western civilization and it is adhered to with considerable fervor of emotion. The progress theory assumes that society must advance from a backward, primitive stage characterized by irrational ignorance to an ultimate civilized stage distinguished by knowledge and technological achievements such as those of the United States. This ethnocentric and sentimental dogma is not a scientific conclusion. The concept of progress assumes that our own form of Western civilization is the highest type of society and its patterns should be imposed on all other societies. Why should

the contented peasants of Saucio be urged to strive for the materialistic goals of the United States which have produced, not happiness, but an appallingly high rate of mental illness, suicide and divorce? The rich religious heritage of Saucio gives the peasants a sense of tranquility and security that more than compensates for their lack of material wealth. Sociological studies might well profit from the anthropological theory of cultural relativity which holds that every culture should be considered in the light of its own goals and values.

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Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York Politics, 1850-1887. By Lee Benson. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1955. Pp. xvi, 310. Illustrated. \$5.50.

Certainly the importance of transportation in American history needs no iteration, and Professor Benson adds his significant study in this field. Basically, this is a study in New York history, but the importance of the metropolis and the character of the phenomena under analysis both contribute to broadening the significance of the story Dr. Benson has to tell. The railroads enabled the other port cities to challenge New York's early supremacy. Soon overcapacity and the necessity of paying dividends on watered stock fostered trunk line rate wars that could only be settled by pooling agreements usually disadvantageous to New York. The reactions of the New Yorkers to these conditions furnish the substance of Dr. Benson's book.

The obvious response to railroad rate discriminations was an appeal for government intervention. Dr. Benson has skillfully delineated the diverse groups that sought this end at one time and another. Only a few individuals toiled unremittingly. The New York merchants were interested, but in varying degrees. Particular transportation policies had different effects on exporters and importers, wholesalers and commodity brokers, merchants of the city and of the hinterland. New York farmers felt the impact of competition from the cheaper lands to the West and bore the brunt of the monopolistic rates the railroads charged from non-competitive points. But, as Dr. Benson shows, the farmers were far from being united in interest. Nor were their transportation needs identical with the merchants'. To make their influence felt the reform agitators had to combine. The tide of demand for regulatory legislation rose and fell as the situation in the railroad world and in the national economy affected a greater or lesser number of these multitudinous interests. Success in the campaign for reform ultimately hinged on the exigencies of New York partisan politics. Here, too, Dr. Benson has ably unraveled an extremely complex situation. The factional strife then dividing both major parties alternately raised and dashed the hopes of the reformers. Repeatedly politicians sought the support of the anti-railroad forces, and repeatedly sacrificed their desires to the higher demands of partisan advantage.

Inevitably the demands for railroad reform found expression on the national level. In this portion of his account, Dr. Benson occasionally stands on shaky ground. His thesis is that New York merchants played the predominant role in the national movement. Since this theme is incidental to his central focus on New York, it is understandable that he should have failed to establish the broader claim. An overwhelming proportion of his material is drawn from New York sources, which tends naturally to exaggerate the importance of New Yorkers. The temptation implicit in his data was doubtless aggravated by a current preoccupation of American historiography. In recent years many efforts have been made to recall the eastern contributions to native American radicalism and reform. The different works of such historians as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Frederick Merk, and Chester M. Destler, for example, are united in this concern. Dr. Benson, too, has enlisted in this cause, although the quarrel is not strictly germane to the main story he has to tell. This incidental enterprise, plus the nature of his materials has led him to underemphasize the influence of financial interests, inland waterway enthusiasts, and, in general, the West, in the national campaign for railroad regulation. These minor shortcomings do not detract from the truly substantial merits of this book. Throughout the author has stressed the opportunism that, among all the actors, overshadowed theory, confirming from yet another quarter the pragmatism of the American character. But most of all, his lucid exposition of the intricate interrelationships among economic and political interest groups sheds a brilliant light on the impact of transportation changes and, more broadly, on the processes by which the American mixed economy developed.

ROBERT W. MCCLUGGAGE,

Loyola University, Chicago

Dr. J. G. M. Ramsey: Autobiography and Letters. Edited by William B. Hesseltine. Tennessee Historical Commission, 1956. Pp. 367. Nashville.

Who was Dr. Ramsey? That was the question in my mind as I opened this book. Before long I learned that Dr. James Gettys McGready Ramsey, Tennessee historian, had left a deep impression upon his native state. In addition to being a physician, he was at one time or another a canal commissioner, a school commissioner, a bank president, a farmer, a Presbyterian elder, a poet, a register of deeds, a contributor to magazines and a writer of books, a Confederate treasury agent, a postmaster, a ferry operator, a trustee of colleges and at all times a "philosopher who thought deeply upon the problems of the South and the nature of the southern people." He was devoted to the political philosophy of Thomas Jefferson and he loved Tennessee, believing, like Robert E. Lee that his first obligation was to his native state. He was sorry when war broke out in 1861 but he never doubted where his loyalty lay. He was then sixty-four years old. Being committed

to the states' rights principles of Jefferson and Calhoun and because he believed that there were irreconcilable differences between the North and the South, Dr. Ramsey, associated himself with the Confederacy, even though the bond was to cost him dearly. Five of his sons joined the southern forces; one died in the war. Two of his daughters died because of privations caused by the war. His youngest daughter was exiled from Knoxville and his wife was forced to become a refugee. Ramsey's beautiful mansion, Mecklenburg, at the head of the Tennessee River, was burned by a northern soldier. Ramsey himself became a Confederate treasury agent. He also served as a surgeon in the army. Although a very wealthy man in 1861, at the end of the war he was impoverished and started life over again as a physician in Charlotte, North Carolina. In 1870 he finished his *Autobiography*. He had previously published a work entitled *Annals of Tennessee*. He had become acquainted by 1850 with Lyman C. Draper of the Wisconsin Historical Society, with the result that an intermittent correspondence was maintained between the two men until Ramsey's death in 1884.

Although this is not an easy book to read, you will learn more about the Civil War from it than from a shelf of Civil War novels such as *Andersonville*. You will find yourself associated with a man of unquestioned honor and probity, who nevertheless believed that Tennessee was a sovereign state, with a right to leave the Union if she so wished. You will be dealing with a man who wrote his thoughts clearly and fearlessly. The fact that you may not like his thoughts will not necessarily make them wrong. He represents an attitude which must be understood by anyone who makes a serious effort to pierce the Civil War period. You will find Ramsey writing at length in justification of reopening the slave trade in the years before the war; you will find him writing at length upon his conviction that Negroes were inferior to white people; you will find him predicting in 1858 that a break would come between the North and the South because he was convinced that the sections were mutually incompatible; you will find him giving many reasons in justification of slavery, which Ramsey believed was morally right; you will find him stating in 1870 that he still believed that the convictions he had held during the Civil War period were correct and justified. If you wish to read the innermost thoughts of a man who sacrificed everything for a cause that he considered just, here is a book that you should read. Unless you are mentally ossified, it may force you to modify some of your dearest convictions.

PAUL KINIERY

Loyola University, Chicago

America Moves West. By Robert E. Riegel. New York. 1956. Third Edition. Pp. xii, 660. \$7.75.

This third edition, like its two predecessors, is a first-rate example of a good textbook. Clear style, neat division of matter, material sufficient for an average student grasp of the subject, sufficient and pertinent bibliographies, positive and urbane approach, have kept the book at the top of the

list for a quarter-century. Riegel first turned it out in his vigorous twenties, and in 1955 he—like the Turner whom he cites on page 633 with some misgivings—still saw in 1955 "no reason for changing as much as a footnote in what he had written "twenty-five years earlier." This edition adds to its forebears one chapter of seventeen pages on "The Golden West," and a few up-to-date titles in the lists of books. The new section on the Pacific Slope follows the pattern of the entire composition. In a word, the work stands as a model text in the basic fact that, when studied, it can be remembered.

This reviewer has used the text in classroom exercise and has found but one point worth cavil, an aloof criticism of the influence of the frontier. Now to his surprise the jacket, under a brilliant American Eagle, carries the caption: "The significance and the influence of the frontier in the development of the distinctive culture of the United States." It seems that publishers take liberties with authors. For the jacket announcement is certainly not the theme of a book whose chapter on "The Historian Discovers the West" quite plainly questions the Turner theory in a series of observations calculated to diminish that hypothesis to the point of liquidation. In those passages the critic would seem to miss the mark. Turner's "democracy" did not take root in political thought but in the actual conditions of life. He would be surprised to read that his essay would "merit any important generalities" beyond the area of his studies, surely not in Canada, Brazil or Russia. It is not to him *idea* (page 638) but *practice*. More confusion appears when the chapter (page 634) indicts the old master for absorption in the economics of the frontier, while later (page 637) Turner stands the charge of over-emphasizing liberty as the propulsive force.

This business is indeed on the high level of interpretation, and no reviewer should pretend to be a corporation sole in that department. But on another note the text has a real hiatus. After Rister delivered his notable presidential address (*Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXVII (1951), 3-16) on "The Oilman's Frontier," no writer should pass over the immense mutation of society and culture that derives from the production of oil in the Western States. Today Texas has a college supported by every county. The vast road-system beyond the Mississippi is no less historic than the enormous fact of the automobile. This black gold belongs in the drama called *America Moves West*.

W. EUGENE SHIELS, S.J.

Xavier University, Cincinnati

The Use of History in the Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1900-1930. By John J. Daly, M.M. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1954. Pp. xv, 218. Paper.

Caleb Cushing, Attorney General of the United States, 1853-1857. By Sister M. Michael Catherine, O.P. The Catholic University of America Press, 1955. Pp. viii, 221. Paper.

Decisions of the Supreme Court are, of course, influenced by many factors. The part played by considerations of history would be difficult

to determine. Father Daly has tried to achieve some estimate by examining the opinions of the justices in the major cases decided between 1900 and 1930. This was the Court under Chief Justices Fuller, White, and Taft. They were courts rather conservative in their viewpoint.

The conclusions finally reached are more or less what would have been expected; namely, that various justices made use of history in varying degrees and with varying results. Some cases, like the Myers case, lent themselves more readily to historical argument than others. Some justices, like Brandeis and White, were better historians than others. In any case, the "criticism of the justices as lacking a knowledge of the facts of history, or as failing to utilize historical data, is on the whole, unjustified."

Sister M. Michael Catherine Hodgson's study of Caleb Cushing, Attorney General in the Pierce administration is one of a number of studies conducted at the Catholic University of America on the development of the American presidency. It represents a personality mediocre in stature in an era of mediocrity. Had the decade of 1850 been less bankrupt in political leadership subsequent history might have been different. Cushing was, in some respects, the most noteworthy political figure the age could produce, and his political instability was fairly typical.

As a practical politician engineering the election of Pierce and as Attorney General supervising the land claims in California, expanding the Office towards departmental status, and flexing muscles towards England and France, he used his position to some advantage. But he did little to clarify the problems of the presidency or enhance the prestige of his party.

The study, while thorough and orderly, is nevertheless unavoidably inconclusive. The person of Cushing remains controversial and vague, because he was that sort of person. The author did well with the little she had to work with.

PAUL WOELFL

Loyola University, Chicago

Notes and Comments

On April 23, 1856, a group of prominent Chicagoans inspired by the Reverend William Barry organized The Chicago Historical Society. Despite the trials and tribulations of a century the dogged persistence of each generation of officers and members has brought the Society to its present flourishing state of health. To commemorate its hundredth birthday Paul M. Angle, Director of the Society, was assigned the task of preparing a suitable history of the hundred years. This he has done in a unique volume: *The Chicago Historical Society 1856-1956. An Unconventional Chronicle.*

Mr. Angle has well chosen all of the documents pertinent to the progress of the Society and has arranged them chronologically with his own comments upon the significance of each particular item. The materials are taken from letters, minutes of meetings, records of events, old pictures, maps, and newspapers. Constantly the history of the Society is tied in with the major episodes and eras of Chicago's development. Above all the human elements stand out, the personalities with their foibles, the characters of the men and women who were so bent upon presenting to the world evidence of Chicago's culture in the form of an historical society and its building sheltering the heirlooms of the city's past. Even the buildings have a humanity about them, the first destroyed in the Chicago fire of 1871, the second destroyed by fire in 1874, the "temporary" abode of twenty years duration, the rock building which the Gilpin's made possible and which was headquarters from 1896 until 1932, when the present building at the entrance to Lincoln Park opened its doors.

The book does much to dispel ideas about the stodginess of history and historical museums and in two instances leans backward to do so, some might say. The style and the descriptions leave few dull moments to the reader. The illustrations with few exceptions are from original paintings or photographs in the Society's collections. The design and the printing and the index are excellent. The list price is a reasonable seven dollars fifty.

* * * *

It is very fortunate that Professor David A. Lockmiller chose to continue with his scholarly work in law and history after becoming president of the University of Chattanooga, for if he had chosen

to be completely distracted by details of his office we would be without his recent definitive biography, *Enoch H. Crowder, Soldier, Lawyer and Statesman*. This was published last year as Volume XXVII of The University of Missouri Studies, University of Missouri, Columbia, where it is available for the modest sum of five dollars.

Crowder was born in Grundy County, Missouri, in 1859 and died seventy-three years later in Walter Reed Hospital. Fifty of these years were spent in public service. Dr. Lockmiller spent fifteen years gathering materials to cover the busy life of the man who was prominent in the news during the first quarter of this century. Crowder entered West Point in 1877, enjoyed some pranks such as old grads love to talk about, and received his commission and an assignment in 1881 to the Eighth Cavalry which was then in Texas. With time on his hands he continued his studies of law until 1884 when on passing the Texas bar examination he was licensed as an attorney. This was a step toward his transfer from the cavalry to the legal department of the Army and then to a professorship in military science and tactics at the University of Missouri. His law and teaching had to be dropped for a year while he was out west helping to capture Geronimo. He spent the next two years at the University then was sent to Dakotas for twenty months beginning with 1889 against Sitting Bull and the Sioux. After trying some cases Crowder was permanently attached to the staff of the Judge Advocate General of the Army in January, 1895.

Thus in four chapters Dr. Lockmiller prepares his biographee for the major work of his life and for his meetings with many national and international figures. The book has a chapter on Crowder's work in the Philippines as staff officer and advocate and another on his sojourn with the Japanese army in Manchuria. His work on election laws in Cuba is followed by his mission to Argentina for the Pan American Congress. He became Advocate General in 1911 and, a recognized authority on military law, Judge Advocate General. His reforms and his adept reorganization of the staff and its procedures won him wide acclaim. Probably the most interesting chapters are those on the Selective Service Act, the famous draft during the first World War, the criticism and slurs, and the court-martial system, in each of which Crowder's name was prominent. The last two chapters cover his work in Cuba as an ambassa-

dor and the conclusion of his fifty years of service. There is a bibliography of source materials and a suitable index.

* * * *

From February to June of this year the press was agog with the news of internal strife in Sovietdom. Khrushchev was demolishing the last icon of communism, Stalin, in the XXth Party Congress of the CPSU. His attack was on the "cult of the individual" as built by Stalin in traitorous contempt for the Marx-Lenin gospel of party rule. The secret speech leaked out. Then a secret report was sent to the party leaders in other countries outside the USSR. The Department of State of the United States released an English translation of it to the press on June 4, without vouching for the authenticity of the document. By July the Russian Institute of Columbia University had gathered the comments on the report of party leaders in other countries and had rushed the whole batch of documents into print. The paper-cover volume of 338 pages, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, is available at The Columbia University Press for one dollar and seventy-five cents.

These documents should be read. Whether Khrushchev is literate enough to have composed his ninety-one page speech on communist principles and aims is a question, but certainly his ideas couched in any terms are clear and damning of the monstrous turpitude of the mass-murderer Stalin. It seems clear that some day someone will write a similar report about Khrushchev's guilt, as is foreshadowed in an editorial in the *Daily Worker*. There are seventeen additional documents: statements of party leaders in Italy, France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States, and editorials from the press of each of these countries. Obviously, international Communism is at a crossroads trying to decide which "cult of the individual" to follow—Stalin's, Lenin's, or Khrushchev's.

* * * *

The "first day of school" for Southern Illinois University at Carbondale was July 2, 1874. It was the opening day of summer school for teachers and prospective teachers, and marked a second great step in teacher-training institutions chartered and supported by the State of Illinois. The normal school remained a college until

1943 when it reached university status. In 1949 it celebrated its diamond jubilee, for which a manuscript history of the institution was prepared by Eli Gilbert Lentz who has been an English instructor and professor and administrator these past forty some years at Southern. In 1955 the manuscript was published as *75 Years in Retrospect: Southern Illinois University 1874-1949*. The story of the struggle to get state aid for the Egypt area of Illinois, to get faculties and buildings, is only additional proof of the adage that education like knowledge makes a bloody entrance. The book is well printed and aptly illustrated, quite in accord with the thoughtful retrospect of Mr. Lentz.

* * * *

Gringo Lawyer is an autobiography by Thomas Waverly Palmer published this year by University of Florida Press, Gainesville. Written in the pleasant, familiar manner of the born conversationalist who is able to see the amusing as well as the dignified side of himself, Mr. Palmer traces the sixty-five years of his life from his birth into a professor's family on the campus of the University of Alabama to his recent retirement from a position as legal consultant for affiliated oil companies of the Caribbean. Finishing his undergraduate studies at Alabama young Palmer studied law at Harvard. He obtained his degree and was awarded a fellowship for travel and study in Spain during 1914. The knowledge of Spanish and Spanish law gained during this sojourn was a prelude to his thirty years of legal activity in Latin America for United States copper and petroleum interests and as counsel for the Petroleum Supply Commission. During his busy years and wide travels he found time to make contributions to the book shelves of law and to law journals. The volume has many interesting anecdotes and observations, to say nothing of Mr. Palmer's meetings with very important people in national and international affairs.

* * * *

A call for help comes from Professor Raúl Noriega. He has long been studying the ancient Mexican hieroglyphic writings hoping to find the key that would lead to their deciphering. He worked out a key to the symbols representing numbers and presented his solution in a 445 page planograph volume: *La Piedra del Sol y 16*

Monumentos Astronómicos del Mexico Antiguo; Simbolos y Claves. The seventeen carved stones are known to archeologists as calendars of the Mayan and later Mexican civilizations. Noriega by putting in his numbers for the signs is able to indicate the number of days in the year of the ancients and the multipliers which give cycles of years. Moreover, the years are estimated astronomically according to the sun, the stars and the planets.

When he presented his findings before the Mexican Society of Anthropology and History the savants discussing the conclusions brought two arguments against Noriega, namely, that no historian or chronicler has written anything about the signs and there is no way of knowing what they meant in the mythology of the ancients, and secondly, that the astronomical calculations need a complete checking before final acceptance. So, Señor Noriega wants the help of a mathematician and an astronomer for the production of his definitive edition on the calendar stones.

* * * *

Agricultural Developments in North Carolina, 1783-1860, by Cornelius Oliver Cathey, published this year by the University of North Carolina Press, is Volume 38 of The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science. This is a scholarly work with an historical and geographic approach to the chapters on landholders, laborers, implements, products, and livestock in the farming areas of North Carolina. It has an ample bibliography and index in the 229 paper bound edition.

* * * *

"A Note on the Relationship between the Protestant Churches and the Revived Ku Klux Klan," by Robert Moats Miller, appears among the Notes and Documents in the August 1956, *Journal of Southern History*. Mr. Miller says: "By 1925 perhaps as many as four or five million white, Protestant, native-born patriots were engaged in or tacitly supporting acts of intimidation, terror, and torture against their Negro, Catholic, Jewish, and foreign-born neighbors." He mentions the generally known tie-up between the Klan and the Protestant churches and the many ministers who were officers in the Invisible Empire, but throws new light upon the position of the Protestant press. One by one he quotes from the Protestant

newspapers and journals and reveals that their writers were almost unanimous in condemning the Klan. Secondly, an investigation of the minutes of the official national conventions, assemblies, and councils, showed condemnation of lynching, mob violence and night-riding, but generally avoided direct mention of the Klan. Thirdly, Mr. Miller separates the many lesser-known ministers of smaller towns who joined the Klan from the better-known and prominent church leaders who repudiated it and its purposes.

* * * *

The young women students of Marygrove College, Detroit, have as in past years collaborated with remarkably good results in the production of their annual historical publication. The 1956 brochure of eighty-two double-column pages is entitled *The Living Church* with a sub-heading "The Voice of the Bishops throughout the World." Each of the authors of the essays presents the thought, interpretation, and action of bishops of the Catholic Church on one or other of the many problems of society, as divorce, family morality, Christian education, social and racial justice, juvenile delinquency, communism and totalitarianism, and human rights. The pages are well documented with episcopal pronouncements. A fine bibliography of twenty-two long columns concludes the nicely printed and illustrated symposium.

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MID-AMERICA

VOLUME XXXVIII

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